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AGENCY TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS
MERTON FERSON *
Representations, commands, threats and other utterances are a species of
acts and may have legal consequences. An utterance may, for example, con-
stitute fraud, negligence, slander or intimidation. The person who speaks is
responsible and it may be that another person, in whose behalf the utterance
was made, also is responsible. This discussion has to do with the question of
what must be shown to establish the ability' of one person to speak in behalf
of another, and thus to make the other liable for the legal consequences.
The problems with regard to the liability of a master-principal for what
his servant-agent 2 says are commonly posed under such headings as these:
The Master's Liability for Slander Uttered by His Servant; The Principal's
Liability on -Contracts Made by His Agent; and The Liability of a Principal
for Fraud Committed by His Agent. This type of heading blurs two ques-
tions which are naturally clear.and distinct into one which is hazy and slippery.
The two questions involved are (1) whether the servant-agent has ability to
speak for the alleged master-principal and (2) what is the legal effect of the
utterance. The ability of one person to speak for another is a self-contained
problem. The legal consequence of the utterance is a distinct problem. The
character of the action and the question of one's agency to perform it remain
the same whether the act constitutes fraud, slander or estoppel or is wholly
innocuous.3 The first question is whether the speaker is vested with ability
to speak for the master-principal. Lumping the two questions-which are
naturally distinct-makes for confusion.
The present discussion is addressed to the agency question. At the risk
* Visiting Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Univ. School of Law; Dean Emeritus,
Univ. of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. There is a curious lack of terms. It is common to speak of the "power" or
"authority" of an agent; but. there is no corresponding word to describe the ability
of a servant to act for, and so to make liable, his master. One does not, for instance,
speak of the "power" or "authority" of a servant to drive a truck. What does the
servant have? The word "ability" is used in the text, but with a full realization
that it is inapt and means many other things. We need a brief term that would stand
for the idea here being described-viz., the ability of a servant to act for, and so to
subject his master to liability. It would be helpful, too, if we had a term that would
mean either (i.e., indifferently) the power of an agent or the ability of a servant
to act for his constituent. While deploring this dearth of terms an attempt is being
made to follow common language.
2. The terms "master-principal" and "servant-agent" are here used with a meaning
that would sometimes be expressed by the "and/or" device, The reason for using
such a noncommittal term will appear liter in this discussion.
3. A similar point is made and admirably developed in a note in 1 U. OF CHI.
L. REv. 137 (1933).
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of being tedious let us first approach the question by way of theory and then
come to a consideration of the cases.
It.is implicit in the literature of Agency that there are two kinds of
acts.4 The "agent" does one kind of acts and must be "authorized" in order
to bind his principal. 5 The "servant" does the other kind of acts and does not
need to be authorized in order to make his master liable; it is sufficient if his
act falls within the "scope of the servant's employment."
It is familiar technique in legal reasoning to put the raw facts of life into
one channel or another. When that has been done, certain corollaries attend
and progress to a legal conclusion is, to an extent, automatic. This technique
is illustrated in the law of Agency. Courts and writers put some cases into
the channel marked "Principal and Agent"; they put other cases into the
channel marked "Master and Servant." When a case is treated as one of
"Principal and Agent" it is deemed necessary, in order to bind the principal,
to find that he authorized the acts alleged to have been done in his behalf.
But when the facts are channeled as a "Master and Servant" case, the mas-
ter is held liable if it appears that the act was done by a servant in the course
of his employment.
The liability imposed on a master for what his servant does is summed
up by the phrase, respondeat superior.6 Extended apologetics have been written
for the doctrine of respondeat superior,7 which is a variety of liability with-
out fault. Whether that doctrine is rational or not, and whatever may be its
true basis, it is an accepted fact of the common law. 8 It is taken as one of the
premises for this article.
"Authority" and "employment" alike depend on the will of the principal-
master. But there is so much difference in what it takes to make out the one
and the other that they are treated under separate headings in digests, ency-
clopedias and textbooks. One generalization can safely be made: "employ-
ment" is easier to establish than "authority"; limitations, prohibitions and
conditions laid down by the principal-master are more respected when the fact
4. Digests and encyclopedias divide the material between "Master and Servant"
and "Principal and Agent."
5. The word "agent" is sometimes used in a broad sense to include all persons
who act in behalf of another, whether they are employed or authorized. At other times
the word is used in a narrow sense to indicate one who makes contracts and other
legal transactions, and who needs to be authorized.
6. The phrase "respondeat superior" is herein used to describe the doctrine
whereby liability is imposed on a master for what his servant does and not to include
the doctrine whereby a principal is bound by his agent's authorized juristic acts. This
usage is justified by. many judicial definitions. See 37 WORDS & PHRASES 423 el. seq.
(perm. ed. 1940).
7. Holmes, Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, 5 id. 1 (1891); Laski, The Basis of
Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1917) ; Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat
Superior" in HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934).
8. "[F]ew doctrines of the law are more firmly established or more in harmony
with accepted notions of social policy than that of the liability of the principal without
fault of his own." Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U. S. 349, 356, 49 Sup. Ct.
161, 73 L. Ed. 415 (1929).
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of authority is in question than they are when the fact of employment is in
question. An incredible number of decisions illustrate the meaning of "em-
ployment" and "authority" respectively. Our problem at the moment gets
down to this: To which class of acts do representations naturally belong? Are
they the kind of act that must be authorized or are they the kind that calls
only for employment? 9 When this question is answered we can turn to the
appropriate case material and legal doctrine. It is abundant, but confusion is
inevitable when we try to assimilate representations with the class of acts to
which they do not belong.
Let us notice the two kinds of acts and the rational basis for the dis-
tinction between "servants" and "agents." It should be noted that servants
and agents are not different kinds of persons.10 They are distinguished
according to what they do. It is like the distinction between barbers and
blacksmiths. They are not different kinds of persons; but there is a rational
basis for distinguishing one from the other according to the kind of acts
each one does.
The conventional classification into servants and agents gives a false
emphasis. It seems to classify the persons, but the basic classification is not of
persons but of acts. Calling the persons who act for others "servants" or
"agents" is of secondary importance." L et us study the two kinds of acts.
What are their distinguishing features? And is it rational that one sort of acts
calls for "authorization," while the other calls only for "employment," in
order that the master-principal shall be affected?
Numerous writers in the field of agency recognize the two kinds of acts.' 2
9. "It is obvious that accurate and certain definition of these terms, 'authority,'
'implied authority,' 'scope of authority,' 'course of employment' and the like, is a sine
qua non to correct reasoning. Such a definition is rarely, if ever, to be found. Identically
the same charge is given the jury in different jurisdictions to describe entirely different
and inconsistent criteria. Miscarriage of justice is inevitable. The correct definition,
it will be found, must resolve itself into an enlarged formula of the standard of
liability applicable to the particular case." Jaggard, J., in Penas v. Chicago M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 934 (1910).
10. Neither are principals and masters different kinds of persons.
11. "Since it is the nature of the act to be performed that constitutes the es-
sential difference between the two classes of representatives, it follows that the same
representative may be both an agent and a servant, and herein lies the source of much
of the confusion that prevails in the discussion of the law of representation." HUFFCUT,
AGENCY 18 (2d ed. 1901).
12. Professor Floyd R. Mechem says: "With respect of the nature of the thing
to be done, there may be marked differences. It may, perhaps, be mere physical labor,
or work, more or less skilled, upon materials, or personal attendance or service; or
it may be representing and taking the place of the employer in business negotiations
with third persons, in the making of contracts or alliances, or in proceedings before
boards, commissions or tribunals. There is a distinction possible between labor or
service on the one hand, and business dealings or representation, on the other. The
latter case involves or contemplates contractual dealings with third persons; the
former does not." MECHEM,, OUTLINES OF AGENCY 2 (3d ed. 1923). Professor Huffcut
puts it this way: "An agent is a representative vested with authority, real or
ostensible, to create voluntary primary obligations for his principal, by making
contracts with third persons, or by making promises or representations to third
persons calculated to induce them to change their legal relations. . . .A servant is a
representative vested with authority to perform operative acts for his master not cre-
1948 ]
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But the comparisons of the two kinds of acts that have been made by these
authors do not go far enough. We need something more specific and detailed.
We need to know exactly how the two kinds of acts are essentially different
from each other. It seems incredible that a vital classification based on the
character of acts should be made without a critical study of acts. The scant
attention that has been given to the difference between the two kinds may
come from a tendency to shy away from anything that smacks of juris-
prudence; the distinction may be deemed pedantic and impractical. But in this
instance it is practical. The outcome of many a lawsuit depends on whether
one who did a particular act needed to be "authorized" by the alleged master-
principal; and that, in turn, depends on the kind of act it was.
The difference between the two kinds of acts has been discussed in de-
tail by the present writer in another article, 13 which serves as ground work
for this discussion. The essential difference, pointed out in the earlier article,
is this: A juristic act is an act manifesting consent to assume a contract
obligation, to transfer a property right or to suffer some other diminution
from one's legal position; non-juristi& acts include all the remainder of
human activities. The nature of a juristic act itself indicates why an agency
to do such an act should be definitely circumscribed and contemplated by the
master-principal-in short why it ghould be "authorized"-in order to bind
the master-principal.
In the first place a juristic act is done for the very purpose of affecting
the legal relations of the person for whom it is done. 14 Why, for example, is
the act of consenting to a contract obligation performed? It is for the very
ating new primary obligations, or bringing third persons into contractual relations with
the master, or otherwise causing them to change their legal position." HurFcuT, AGENCY
17 (2d ed. 1901). Wharton says: Agency "relates to business transactions" while the
work of a servant "relates to manual services." WHARTON, AGENCY § § 19, 20 (1876).
Professor Frank E. Horack says: "In general these acts may be divided into acts im-
posing contractual obligations on the principal and those subjecting him to tort liability."
Vicarious Liability for Fraud and Deceit in Iowa, 16 IOWA L. REV. 361 (1931). And
says Professor William R. Vance: "The difference between a servant and an agent is
well settled and familiar. The test is the possession of authority to bring the constituent
into contractual relations with third parties." Liability for the Unauthorized Torts of
Agents, 4 MxcF[. L. REv. 199, 204-205 (1906). Jaggard, J., puts it this way: "The
rule of master and servant concerns all acts of the representation which are non-con-
tractual." Penas v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 933
(1910).
13. Ferson, The Nature of Legal Transactions and Juristic Acts: Analysis of
Common; Factors and Variations, 31 CORN. L. Q. 105, 129-139 (1945). The two kinds
of acts, so commonly assumed to exist, have also been discussed by several writers
on jurisprudence and the differences between the two kinds of acts have been pointed
out. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 117 (13th ed. 1924) ; MARKBY, ELEMENTS
OF LAW 125 (6th ed. 1905); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 481 (9th ed. 1937); STAre,
INSTITUTIONS 01 THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 94 (Moore's ed. 1832). These writers do not
use a uniform terminology. Professor Salmond, for instance, makes the distinction be-
tween an "act of the party" and an "act of the law." And Professor Holland makes the
distinction between "juristic act" and non-juristic act." The terms used by Professor
Holland--"juristic" and "non-juristic"-are being used in this article. These terms
may be high sounding ones, but their meaning is simple enough.
14. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 118 (13th ed. 1924) ; MARKY, ELEMENTS
OF LAW 125 (6th ed. 1905); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 192 (9th ed. 1937).
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purpose of binding the person for whom the act is done. By way of contrast,
non-juristic acts are not usually done for the purpose of altering legal rela-
tions. One does not drive a truck or employ a truck driver for the purpose of
making himself liable to third persons. He has other reasons for wanting the
truck driven. Creating liability is not an intended or essential part of the
work. Note the contrast, then, between acts that are done for the very purpose
of changing legal relations and acts that make up our workaday routine-acts
that are not intended to have legal consequences. It is one thing for a con-
stituent to engage a person who will deliberately tamper with the constituent's
primary 15 legal relations, and a different thing to engage a worker who might
incidentally do something for which the law will impose a result.16
In the second place the juristic act always derogates directly from the
position of the person for whom it is done.17 An agent vested with power to
do this kind of acts can, by the mere fiat of his will, give or bargain away
that which belongs to his principal. A principal will not lightly be presumed
to confer such autocratic power. It is rational to require a clear showing that
the principal contemplated the power he was creating and that the act of the
agent falls within the limits fixed by the principal. Consider, on the other
hand, non-juristic acts. A man wants his farm work done or his truck
driven; a railroad company wants the fence along its right of way maintained
and its crossing guarded. Such work usually redounds directly to the benefit
of the employer. The reason for the employment is usually apparent. Now and
then something within the employment goes amiss. "[I] t would seem difficult
to contemplate business operation without including the mistakes, errors and
deceits of its agents as one of the incidents of thar type of business." 18 To
deny the fact of employment in such instances is to negate the whole employ-
ment. The employer-within wide limits-must take the bitter with the
sweet.' 9
The foregoing attempt to rationalize the requirement of authorization
for juristic acts and the dispensing with such requirement in non-juristic acts
15. For definition of primary rights see HOLLAND, ELE-MENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE
147 (13th ed. 1924).
16. "He [the employer] is merely held responsible in damages for reasons the law
holds sufficient. His liability is 'imposed' or 'imputed.' His authority to the servant to do
the act complained of is in strict logic as wholly irrelevant as the fact that he may
have expressly forbidden the servant so to act. His authority does not exist in fact.
If the language of authority be used, the authority is purely fictitious." Jaggard, J.,
in Penas v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 929 (1910).
17. Ferson, supra note 13, at 138.
18. Horack, Vicarious Liability for Fraud and Deceit in Iowa, 16 IOWA L. REV.
361, 364 (1931).
19. "The responsibility of a master for the wrongful act of his servant does not
depend merely on the question of authority, expressed or implied. He may be liable though
the act be beyond any authority actually given by him. The expression 'scope of authority'
in its relative sense may be wider than the limits of the 'authority' itself. ... The master's
responsibility may exist, notwithstanding he proves he has actually forbidden the act. ...
The master's responsibility may even exist where the law itself forbids the act as
criminal." Bugge v. Brown, 26 C. L. R. 110, 9 Br. R. C. 631, 638 (Aust. 1919),.
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may be supererogation. The distinction has long been made in the law, but as
pointed out above, it has been made under the guise of distinguishing agents
from servants. It may be too late to rail against this circumlocution, but it has
caused confusion in the type of cases we have set out to discuss-viz., the
agency-to-speak cases. How does it cause confusion? That will appear when
we boil down some of the early fraud cases to a false syllogism that seems
implicit in those cases. The syllogism runs like this:
One who sells is an agent.
The acts of an agent need to be authorized.
Therefore fradulent statements of an agent who sells need to be
authorized.20
The syllogism is misleading: ambiguity lurks in two of its terms-the verb
"sells" and the noun "agent." The verb "sells" includes two distinct kinds of
acts: (1) the mechanical or non-juristic act of persuading another person to
buy 21 and (2) the juristic act of manifesting consent to enter the contract or
to make the, transfer.2 2 To "sell," in the sense of persuading another person,
consists in exhibiting, demonstrating, extolling the article and perhaps making
otherstatements that this or that is so. Such acts fall definitely in the non-
juristic class. They are not manifestations of the will to come under obligation,
transfer rights or give up any primary legal advantage. They come under the
head of employment. On the other hand to "sell" in the sense of putting
across title, or creating an obligation to do so, consists of such acts as signing
and delivering a paper or otherwise manifesting consent to this or that sur-
render of primary right. Such manifestations of the will definitely are juristic
acts. They call for autholity. And so the verb "sells" in the above syllogism
may mean acts of either or both kinds.
The noun "agent" is likewise ambiguous. It was pointed out above that
one is denominated "agent" or "servant" according to the kind of acts he
does for his constituent. This also leads to confusion when we note how com-
20. "The scope of the agent's authority was to sell or to procure a purchaser for
the land. Thusfar he bound his principal by his acts. He could not bind them by un-
truthful and unauthorized representations touching the character of the thing which he
was authorized to sell." Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Iowa 979, 170 N. W. 435, 437 (1919).
21. Landskroener v. Henning, 221 Mich. 558, 191 N. W. 943 (1923). "Certainly
it would be the utopia of which all salesmen dream if purchasers could be found who made
no inquiries-asked no questions-required no persuasion." Horack, Vicarious Liability
for Fraud and Deceit in Iowa, 16 IowA L. REv. 361, 367 (1931).
22. "It has been uniformly held that the words 'sell' and 'sale,' as applied to the
relation between the owner of land and a real estate broker working to secure a
purchaser of the land, import no more than the act of bringing the owner and purchaser
together on terms satisfactory to both, or procuring a purchaser able, ready, and willing
to buy on the terms fixed by the seller; so that, for example, the broker cannot, without
special authority, bind the owner by a contract of sale in his name." Resky v. Meyer, 98
N. J. L. 168, 119 Atl. 97 (1922).
"Merchandise brokers making an offer may have authority to close a sale, and thus
to represent the vendor for that purpose. Not so where,-as here,-they must report to
the vendor any offer by the vendee, and the offer must, expressly or impliedly, be ac-
cepted by the vendor before there is any contract." Euclid Candy Co. v. Whitney-Central
Trust & Savings Bank, 48 F. 2d 757 (C. C. A. 6th 1931).
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mon it is for a servant-agent to do both kinds of acts. By way of illustration
consider the clerk in a small store who keeps stock in order (non-juristic
acts) and transfers goods to buyers (juristic acts).23 How confusing it. is to
say the servant-agent needs "authority" or not according to what we call him !
He needs authorization or not, according to what particular act is in question.
And now what about representations? Must they be authorized in order
to hold the master-principal for their legal consequence? The answer is, no.
They are not juristic acts and they need only to come within the scope of a
servant-agent's employment in order to hold the master-principal. The fore-
going discussion of the theoretical aspect of our problem.comes to this:
There is a basic distinction between two kinds of acts-juristic and non-
juristic. It is rational to require "authorization" for the juristic acts and only
"employment" for the non-juristic acts, and the courts carry out that idea.
Some confusion has come from putting an indirect and misleading step into
the process of reasoning from the act in question to the fact of agency to
perform the act. That extra step, as indicated, is to 'go from the act that has
been done to a naming of the person who did it--calling him "agent" or
"servant,"-and then derive from his name (servant or agent) a decision of
whether he needs to have authority or merely employment. A simple and
direct process is to note the character of the act: is it juristic or non-juristic?
When this question' is answered it is a one-step process to determine whether
the act needed to be authorized or not. It is the kind of act that indicates
the need for authorization, not the kind of person; and it should not be deemed
important whether we call the actor servant or agent.
Our case law is grouped in the digests as though the question of agency
varied according to whether statements constitute fraud, slander, estoppel or
have some other legal effect. In deference to that arrangement, illustrative
cases will be cited from the conventional groups. It will be seen, however,
that in the long run the agency question is the same whether the representa-
tion brings this or that legal consequence.
REPRESENTATIONS WITH REGARD TO PERSONAL SAFETY
Let us start with a group of cases where the making of representations
has been deemed employment and no contention has been made that the person
who made the representation needed to be authorized in order to hold the
employer liable. They are cases where servants were assigned jobs of making
representations to third persons with regard to their safety. The watchman
at a railroad crossing is a familiar example. His signal to an approaching
driver to proceed across the tracks is essentially a representation. It amounts
23. See for additional illustration, Vance, Liability For the Unauthorized Torts of
Agents, 4 MICH. L. REv. 199, 205 (1906).
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to a statement that no train is coming and that it is safe to cross. The signal
-the representation-is sometimes made by beckoning with a flag;24 in other
instances a man stationed in a tower makes the representation by flashing dif-
ferent colored lights. 25 A representation thus made is sometimes false and the
third person who relies on it is consequently injured. Employers in such cases
have stubbornly denied their liability on various grounds, but it has hardly
occurred to them to claim that the watchman was not authorized to give false
information. It is taken for granted that it is not a question of authority.
The only agency question is whether the watchman was acting in his employ-
ment.
Even in cases where the employee who made the false representation was
called an "agent" the employer has been held without a showing that the
agent was authorized. In such a case 26 there was testimony as follows: "The
nigger asked Cornette [a station agent] if there was any trains coming and
Cornette told him no, there was no trains coming." This was a false representa-
tion: it induced a boy to drive onto the track where he was killed by a coining
train. The Railroad Company was held liable; the agent's representation was
"in the life of his duty." In another case, a landlord was held for the willful
misrepresentation of his agent.27 In the language of the court, "the plaintiff di-
rected the agent's attention to the decrepit and threatening condition of the
ceiling in one of the rooms, expressing her apprehension of injury therefrom
and her intention to vacate the rooms. She was assured by the agent that he
had caused the ceiling to be examined and tested, and that it had been found
to be secure. Later, during the same term, the ceiling fell upon the plaintiff,
who, relying upon these assurances, had remained in the occupancy of the
rooms, causing physical injuries to her. Upon the trial it appeared from suffi-
cient proof that the ceiling had not been inspected or tested, and the agent's
representations that it had were knowingly untrue as a matter of fact." 28 And,
said the court, "the agent's representations having been made within the
scope of his duties, the defendant's answerability therefore is not debatable." 29
MISREPRESENTATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE SAFETY OR WHEREABOUTS
OF GOODS
These cases, like those in the preceding group, are cases where agents
made false representations within the scope of their employment, and the
courts without hesitation have charged them to the employers. In one case 3 0
24. Peck v. Michigan Cent. R. R., 57 Mich. 3, 23 N. W. 466 (1885); Buchanan v.
Chicago M. & St. P. R. R., 75 Iowa 393, 39 N. W. 663 (1888).
25. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Ebert, 102 Fla. 641, 138 So. 4 (1931).
26. Chicago & A. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Fed. 157, 160, (C. C. A. 8th 1906).
27. Williams v. Goldberg, 58 Misc. 210, 109 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
28. 109 N. Y. Supp. at 16.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Stevens v. Boston & M. R. R., 1 Gray 277 (Mass. 1854).
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the plaintiff sent his teamster to the depot to get some bales of goods that
were expected to arrive. The "agent" of the railroad company said "that
the goods had already been delivered, and were not there." The goods were
in fact at the depot and burned during the following night. The railroad
company was held liable. The ability of the agent to speak for the company-
even in making a misrepresentation-was not questioned.
The United States Supreme Court has held that even a willful misrepre-
sentation by a station agent makes the employing company liable for the con-
sequences. 31 The defendant company employed an agent, McDonnell, in its
Savannah, Georgia, office, "whose duty it was, and whose continuous practice
it had been, to give notice to those engaged in the cotton trade, including
petitioner, a cotton factor in Savannah, of the arrival of cotton at the
Savannah terminal under 'order notify' bills of lading. There was evidence
from which the jury could have found that on March 19, 1925, McDonnell,
so acting, gave petitioner notice of arrival of a shipment of cotton under a
designated order-notify bill of lading; that later, on the same day, a local
bank presented to petitioner the described bill of lading, regular in form and
properly endorsed, with an attached draft on petitioner for $10,000, which
petitioner paid in reliance upon the notice of arrival given by the agent and
the apparent regularity of the documents. . . . The draft and the bill of
lading, purporting to be issued by respondent at- its Charleston office,
eventually proved to have been forged and negotiated by McDonnell in
Charleston, while temporarily absent from his duties in Savannah, and his
entire course of conduct with respect to them, including his false notice to
petitioner, was in the successful pursuance of a scheme to defraud petitioner
of the amount paid by it on the draft." 32 Liability in this case was based on
the false arrival notice-not on the false bill of lading. The liability of carriers
on false bills of lading will be discussed later.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
Statements are sometimes made by an employee in the course of his em-
ployment that are libelous or slanderous. Such statements are not commonly
authorized, and in a good many cases it appears that they were positively
forbidden. Is the employer chargeable with such statements-on a mere showing
that they fell within the employment of the persons who made them? Some
early cases exonerated the employer, particularly in the case of slander. One
court explains the holding this way: "By reason of the fact that the offense
of slander is the voluntary and tortious act of the speaker, and is more likely
to be the expression of momentary passion or excitement of the agent, it is,
31. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U. S. 349, 49 Sup. Ct. 161, 73 L. Ed.
415 (1929).
32. 278 U. S. at 352, 353.
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we think, rightly held that the utterance of slanderous words must be ascribed%
to the personal malice of the agent, rather than to an act performed in the
course of his employment." 33 Other courts took the position that a corpora-
tion by reason of its nature could not commit slander and therefore -could
not be held liable for a slanderous statement made by its servant.3 4
It would seem that the reasoning followed by these courts is unsound.
The fact that there was malice on the part of a speaker who utters slander
should not ipso facto take him out of the scope of his employment. It has
become settled that other kinds of acts done by a servant with malice may
still be in the scope of his employment.35 What about holding a corporation
for slander? To be sure "it has no tongue;" "it cannot talk;" but that is
beside the point. A servant who utters slander does have a tongue; he can
talk; and it is for his act that the corporation should be held. The specious
reasoning of these early cases has given way. A large majority of the courts
recognize that slander and libel are within the general rule that a master
or principal is liable for the torts of a servant or agent when done within
the scope of his employment. 36
It thus appears that statements, even though they are libelous or
slanderous, fit into the simple proposition that is here being developed.
Statements are a species of non-juristic acts and agency to make them
does not depend on authorization. The fact that they were made by an
employee within the scope of his employment is sufficient to charge the
employer.
THREATS AND COMMANDS
Threats and commands are perhaps forms of representations. They are,
at any rate, non-juristic acts and agency to make them would, according to
33. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala. 574, 43 So. 210 (1906).
34. In Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Mo. 213 (1852) where suit had been brought
against a bank for slander the court said: "The bank is a corporation-it cannot utter
words-it has no tongue ... no mind, heart or soul to be put into motion by malice."
And in Eichner v. Bowery Bank, 24 App. Div. 63, 48 N. Y. Supp. 978, 980 (1st Dept.
1897), a New York court in disposing of slander.suit said: "The corporation itself could
not talk."
35. 2 MECHEm, AGENCY § 1960 (2d ed. 1914).
36. Gillis v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283, 150 A. L. R. 1338
(1943). In Citizen's Life Assurance Co. v. Brown, [1904] A. C. 423, decided by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the syllabus reads as follows: "A corporation
cannot be held to be incapable of malice so as to be relieved of liability for malicious
libel when published by its servant acting in the course of his employment. Although the
servant may have had no actual authority, express or implied, to write the libel con-
plained of, containing statements against the plaintiff which he knew to be untrue, if he
did so in the course of an employment which is authorized, the corporation is liable."
The doctrine of this case is cited with approval in Penas v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926 (1910). The case of Hypes v. Southern Ry. Co., 82 S. C.
315, 64 S. E. 395, 396 (1909) holds that the "old doctrine that a corporation, having
no mind, cannot be liable for acts of agents involving malice has been completely ex-
ploded in modern jurisprudence" and that a corporation is liable for slander spoken by its
agent while acting within the scope of his employment. See also Sawyer v. Railroad, 142
N. C. 1, 54 S. E. 793 (1906).
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sound theory, depend on employment-authorization being unnecessary. The
decisions bear that out. In an English case,37 the defendant operated a
private detective agency. He sent an employee to obtain certain letters.
The employee, in order to get possession of the letters, told a woman, the
plaintiff in the action that followed, that he was a detective inspector from
Scotland Yard, representing the military authorities, and that he wanted
her because she had been corresponding with a German spy. The threat
turned out to be injurious and the employer was held liable on the ground that
the employee's action was in the scope of his employment. 38
Numerous cases have come before the National Labor Relations Board
where a superintendent or a foreman has made anti-union statements to other
employees. Is it necessary that the person who made the statement shall have
been authorized to do so in order to charge the employer with unfair labor
practice? The answer is, no. "The Board has adopted as a definite policy the
doctrine of respandeat superior, by virtue of which the employer is held
liable for the acts of the employee done within the scope of the employment.3 9
This policy is sustained by the cotirts.40
FALSE AND FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS THAT INDUCE THE MAKING OF
CONTRACTS OR OTHER TRANSACTIONS
In the cases here discussed the representations are frequently made by
a person who is called an "agent," and who does both juristic and non-juristic
acts for his employer. It may, for example, be the business of a sales agent:
(1) to make representations about an article and thus persuade someone to
buy it (non-juristic acts) and (2) to transfer or contract to transfer the
subject of sale (a juristic act). We are here concerned with agency to make
the representations, not with agency to make the contract obligation or the
transfer.
A representation, whether true or false, is a species of non-juristic
act. Fraud" is a false representation made with intent to deceive. 41 Its
character as a non-juristic act should put fraud under the head of "Master
37. Janvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K. B. 316.
38. Bankes, L. J., in the course of his opinion in this case said: "The real contention
was that this act of Barker [the employee] in threatening the plaintiff could not in law
be held to be within the scope of his employment, because, first, he had no actual authority;
and secondly, it is not to be supposed that a private inquiry agent would give his agent
instructions to do such an act. The judge put this point rather more favorably to the
defendants than he need have done. He asked them whether Barker was acting in the
scope of his employment. The jury answered, yes, and they we're quite justified in so
answering." Id. at 325.
39. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 292 (1940).
40. H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 514, 61 Sup. Ct.
376, 85 L. Ed. 322 (1941); International Assn. of Machinists v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 311 U. S. 72, 61 Sup. Ct. 83, 85 L. Ed. 50 (1940); National Labor
Relations Board v. Frank Bros. Co., 137 F. 2d 989 (C. C. A. lst 1943).




and Servant" alongside of other non-juristic acts. Fraud has, however,
become tangled with juristic acts and is commonly channeled under the head
of "Principal and Agent." This gives the impression that the fraud of an
agent-like the making of a contract by him-must be authorized in order
to charge the principal. The fancied need for authorization has caused
courts to exonerate the master-principal in a good many cases where a simple
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior would have held the master-
principal. In the case of Elliston v. Stockton,42 for instance, the owner of
a farm employed an agent to procure a purchaser for his farm. The agent
represented to the plaintiff, who later bought the farm, that the soil was
"black sandy loam" and that the ground "never overflowed." These repre-
sentations were false and the agent knew they were false. The plaintiff sued
the seller for deceit. He was denied recovery, because the agent had not
authority to make the false representations.
43
Let us notice a few additional illustrative cases. In an early English
case,44 one Youngman "was employed by the defendants to sell their timber."
Youngman, in order to sell a log of defendants to the plaintiff, represented
that the log was "perfectly sound," though he knew the log was defective
and turned it over to conceal the defect. Action was brought against the
defendant to recover for the fraud perpetrated by Youngman. It was "admitted
that no such fraud has been committed by the defendant himself, nor author-
ized by him either by previous authority or by any ratification or adoption of
it when he knew of it." There was a nonsuit in the trial court which was
sustained on appeal. In the opinion of Bramwell, B., the plaintiff "ought to
fail, for he shews neither the actual commission of fraud by the defendant,
nor any authority for its comrhission, nor any ratificatfon or adoption of it." 46
Martin, B., concurred in sustaining the nonsuit and the nub of his argument
appears in his rhetorical question and answer: "Was Youngman in fact
authorized by the defendants to make the representation? He was not." 4r
These judges seem to be right in saying there was no authorization of Young-
man to bind the defendant by false representation. But they mistook the
character of representations. They are non-juristic, and do not have to be
authorized, any more than the improper driving of a truck has to be authorized,
in order to make the employer liable.
47
In Janecko v. Manheimer..48 the defendant listed city lots with a real
42. 185 Iowa 979, 170 N. W. 435 (1919).
43. Said Gaynor, J., "The representations to bind the principal must appear to be
representations which the agent by his employment was authorized to make." 170 N. W.
at 437.
44. Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 158 Eng. Rep. 437 (Ex. 1861).
45. Id. at 189, 158 Eng. Rep. at 444.
46. Id. at 198, 158 Eng. Rep. at 447.
47. Youngman turned the log to conceal the defect. Is that the kind of act that must
be authorized in order to hold the master-principal liable?
48. 77 F. 2d 205 (C. C. A. 7th 1935).
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estate broker for sale. The broker told the plaintiff the location of the block
and showed him the boundary lines. The plaintiff made a purchase and
then' discovered a year and a half later "that the land described in the deed
was about a half mile east of the plot which was shown to the purchasers
by the agent, and was of much less value." The plaintiff brought an action for
damages and was denied recovery. Said the court: "A principal will not be
held personally liable for his agent's deceit unless he has authorized the deceit
or participated in it or has knowingly permitted the agent to commit it....
The doctrine of presumed, implied or apparent authority will not operate to
hold an innocent principal for the tort of his agent .... The broker has no
power to bind his principal beyond the express authority conferred upon
him." 49
In Sewell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,50 a hostess-tenant with authority
to negotiate the rental of apartments to prospective tenants informed the
plaintiff, in response to inquiries, that the apartment was "free from vermin."
This statement was false, and the plaintiff was forced to move and to discard
articles of furniture. He sought to recover against the landlord for deceit
but the court directed a verdict for the defendant, which was sustained on
appeal. Said the court: "It is not claimed that the defendant authorized the
making of any such false representations or that it had knowledge of them ....
[S]uch a principal is not liable in tort in an action for deceit for the un-
authorized fraudulent representations of his agent." 51
The exoneration of the master-principal in each of the cases that have
just been cited was the logical result of the assumption that representations-
like the making of contracts-must be authorized in order to bind a master-
principal. But there was instinctive revolt by most courts: the result reached
in the cases cited was not desired. Said Willes, J., in Barwick v. English Joint
Stock Bank: 52 "But with respect to the question, whether a principal is
answerable for the act of his agent in the course of his master's business,
and for his master's benefit, no sensible distinction can be drawn between the
case of fraud and the case of any other wrong." And in Briggs v. Life Ins.
Co., of Va.,53 where the contention was made that the agent's fraudulent
representations had not been authorized, Walker, J., said: "We can well
answer this contention by stating what was said in regard to a similar one in
Peebles v. Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233, 24 Am. Rep. 447 [1877]: 'There is
no reason that occurs to us why a different rule should be applicable to cases
of deceit from what applies to other torts.' "54
49. Id. at 207. .
50. 118 N. J. L. 308, 192 Atl. 575 (1937).
51. 192 Atl. at 575. See also Lawrence v. Wise, 235 Ala. 54, 177 So. 175 (1937);
Baker v. Clark, 14 Ala. App. 152, 68 So. 593 (1915).
52. L. R. 2 Ex. 259, 265 (1867).
53. 155 N. C. 73, 70 S. E. 1068 (1911).
54. 70 S. E. at 1069.
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These last two quotations assimilate fraud with other torts. It would
seem implicit that fraud should come under the settled doctrine of respondeat
s perior, which makes a master liable for torts committed by a servant in
the scope of his employment. The court says as much in the Barwick case,
in the following language: "The general rule is, that the master is answerable
for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course
of the service and for the master's benefit, though no express command or
privity of the master be proved." 55 Professor Philip Mechem commenting on
the case wherein the foregoing rule was enunciated says, "This case, which
retrospectively appears so inevitable in the light of the general law of
principal and agent as scarcely to express more than a platitude, represents
the settled law of England and that of the very great majority of American
States." 56 And says Judge Learned Hand: "Although the law was at one time
otherwise, at least in this country .... it is now settled both in the federal
system .... and in England .... that an agent does not cease to be acting
within the scope of his authority when he is engaged in a fraud upon a third
person. That has probably always been the more generally accepted doctrine." r7
. This doctrine has been applied in a wide variety of fact situations.
A few illustrative cases will be noted. In a landmark case, already referred
to,58 there was evidence that the manager of a bank fraudulently represented
to the plaintiff that a certain customer's account was good and thus persuaded
the plaintiff to give credit to the customer. The customer's account was not
good and the plaintiff lost the value of goods sold to the customer on credit.
The plaintiff sued the bank for an alleged fraud. The trial judge directed a non-
suit. But it was held on appeal that the foregoing evidence should have been
submitted to the jury and that if there was fraud committed by the manager
it could be charged to the bank. In a Louisiana case 59 the defendants were
engaged inthe renting of linens to various customers. The plaintiff, an ice
cream company, was one of the customers so supplied with linens. A route
man named Leman delivered the linens and collected the rental. He devised
a scheme to defraud the plaintiff by which he would deliver a number of
gowns and towels to the supply room of the plaintiff and then make out a
"fictitious C.O.D. slip" for a larger number and collect payment for the
larger number. He would then account to the defendant, his employer, for
the number actually delivered. In this way he defrauded the plaintiff of
"approximately $1300." The plaintiff was denied recovery because it was
"grossly negligent" in not checking the number of articles delivered. But with
regard to the agency question the court found "no difficulty in resolving that
55. L. R. 2 Ex. 259, 265.
56. MECHEM, CASES OX AGENCCY 230 (3d ed. 1942).
57. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. R., 153 F. 2d 757, 759 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
58. Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259 (1867).
59. Yoars v. New Orleans Linen Supply Co., 185 So. 525 (La. App. 1939).
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Leman, as the agent of the New Orleans Linen Supply.Company, was acting
for and on behalf of his principal in all of his dealings with the plaintiff."
Be it noted that the gist of Leman's wrong was a misrepresentation. He
virtually said to plaintiff, "I have delivered to your supply room so many
gowns and towels," whereas he had delivered a smaller number.
60
There are several cases 61 where actions were brought against telegraph
companies for damages sustained because agents of the companies transmitted
or delivered forged telegrams. The companies are uniformly held liable for
such defaults of their agents. "[T]he delivery of a telegram constitutes a
representation that the message which came over its wires was genuine." 62
While the law is settled that a principal is liable for the false and
fraudulent representations made by his agent in the scope of his employment
the ratio decidendi is not always clear. Some writers are explicit in basing
this settled law on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Judge Story, for
example, says: "He [the principal] is held liable to third persons in a civil
suit for the frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negli-
gences, and other malfeasances, or misfeasances, and omissions of duty, of
his agent, in the course of his employment, although the principal did not
authorize, or justify, or participate in, or, indeed, know of such misconduct,
or even if he forbade the acts, or disapproved of them. In all such cases, the
rule applied, Respondeat Superior . . ." 63 And Mr. Justice Stone in dis-
posing of a false-representations case says: "Undoubtedly formal logic may
find something to criticize in a rule which fastens on the principal liability
for the acts of his agent, done without the principal's knowledge or consent
and to which his own negligence has not contributed. But few doctrines of the
law are more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of
social policy than that of the liability of the,principal without fault of his
own." 64 Other judges and writers, however, give lip service to the idea that
an "agent" must be "authorized" in order to make a false representation
for his principal. Such is the tyranny of words.
6 5
60. The facts in Ripon Knitting Works v. Railway Express Agency, 207 Wis. 452,
240 N. W. 840 (1932), were similar. The delivery agent for an express company would
first deliver goods to the receiving clerk of the plaintiff, who signed a receipt; then the
express agent would go to the plaintiff's cashier and get the amount due, in the meantime
adding fictitious items and charges to the delivery sheet. These excess amounts were
kept by the agent. When the fraud was discovered the plaintiff sued the express company
for the amount of the overpayment. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.
61. Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 Harr. 155, 172 Atl. 757 (Del. 1934) ; McCord
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 184, 39 N. W. 315 (1888); Postal Tel. & Cable
Co. v. Traders State Bank, 150 S. W. 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
62. Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Traders State Bank, 150 S. W. 745, 747 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912).
63. STORY, AGENCY § 452 (5th ed. 1857).
64. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U. S. 349, 49 Sup. Ct. 161, 73 L. Ed.
415 (1929).
65. "It is a palpable misnomer to hold the master liable because of the authority
to the servant to do the thing which the master has openly, in good faith, and expressly
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Courts that take this tack reach the desired result, however, by giving
the word "authorize" a meaning that is substantially the same as "employ."
By one form of language or another, courts have brought fraudulent rep-
resentations, made by an agent, within the purview of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. "Water will find its level;" deceitful representations
have found their .level. Like other tortious acts, they are chargeable to an
employer whether the person who made them is called "servant" or "agent";
and whether the court speaks of him as being "authorized" or as being
"employed." 66
It should be borne in mind that there are two ingredients of fraud: (1)
a misrepresentation and (2) an intent to deceive. The cases we have discussed
were cases where agents had made representations intending to deceive.
The agent in each instance furnished both of the ingredients of fraud-the
false representation and the wicked thinking. We found that the principals
have come to be uniformly held liable in such cases. And if a principal gives
false information to his agent-or withholds information-and thus induces
the agent to speak falsely, the principal may be held for his own fraud.
But suppose an agent has made a false representation believing tlmt
it was true, and if the agent had known what the principal knew the repre-
sentation would be fraudulent. Has anyone committed fraud? Is the principal
liable for fraud? These questions have come up from time to time and it
seems to be settled law that in such a state of facts neither the agent nor the
principal has committed fraud and neither is liable for fraud.
A case of this type came up early in England. 67 The owner of a house,
plaintiff in the case, employed a man by the name of Clark to let the house for
him. The defendant, who later contracted to take the house said to Clark,
"Pray, Sir, is there anything objectionable about the house." To this Mr. Clark
replied, "Nothing whatever." In truth the house adjoining to the plaintiff's
house was a "brothel of the worst description." The owner was well aware of
the situation but Clark was not. When the defendant was sued on his written
agreement he set up the defense of fraud and thus set for himself the task
of proving fraud. This he failed to do. Said Parke, B. : "Now the simple facts,
that the plaintiff knew of the existence of the nuisance, and that the agent,
who did not know of it, represented that it did not exist, are not enough to
constitute fraud: each person is innocent, because the plaintiff makes no false
representation, and the agent, though he makes one, does not know it to be
forbidden the servant to do." Jaggard, J., in Penas v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 112
Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 933 (1910).
66. "While the language of authority is often used to describe the liability of the
master under such and similar circumstances, it is strained to meet the conclusion which the
court has reached by independent reasoning." Jaggard, J., in Penas v. Chicago M. &
St. P. Ry., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 931 (1910).
67. Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6, M. & W. 358, 151 Eng. Rep. 450 (Ex. 1840).
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false; and it seems to me to be an untenable proposition, that if each be
innocent, the act of either or both can be a fraud." 68
The better rule-seems to be that, when proof of fraud is vital to the
plaintiff's right to recover-or to the defendant's privilege to escape-such
fraud cannot be made out by hitching the knowledge of the principal to the
utterance of the agent. Says Patrick Delvin: "There is no way of combining
an innocent principal and agent so as to produce dishonesty. You may add
Imowledge to knowledge or, as Slesser, L. J. put it, state of mind to state of
mind. But you cannot add an innocent state of mind to an innocent state of
mind and get as a result a dishonest state of mind. You cannot add innocent
knowledge to innocent knowledge and get guilty knowledge.... There is no
possible way known to philosophy or psychology by which an intent can be di-
vided; and no possible reason why the law should try to invent one. If you
cannot find an intent in either the principal or the agent'separately, you will not
produce it by knocking their heads together." 69
REPRESENTATIONS THaAT ESTOP
The circumstances under which a false statement is made may be such
that the person for whom it was made can be estopped to deny its truth.
How can agency to make such a representation for another be established?
Specifically, must it be authorized? Or can the agency be established by a
showing that the making of the representation came within the scope of the
employment of the person who made it?
When that question has come up free from entanglements, courts have
not hesitated to use what is virtually the scope-of-employment test although
they have done so in terms of "agent" and "authority." In a Georgia case,70
the defendants, operators, of a rice mill, employed a superintendent, who
issued receipts acknowledging that an individual by the name o Schley had
stored in the mill a quantity of rice. Schley had no rice in the mill, but he
pledged the receipts which the superintendent had given him with the plain-
tiff and thus obtained a sum of money. Action was brought against the de-
fendant on its failure to deliver rice in pursuance of the receipts. The court
held that the defendant was estopped to deny that it had received the rice.
Said the court: "Though in fact no goods had been received for storage, the
recital in the special receipt being utterly false, nevertheless the recital will
have the same effect in protecting such bona fide pledgee as if the goods had
been received and stored." 71
68. Id. at 373, 151 Eng. Rep. at 456.
69. Delvin, Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Division of Responsibility Between Prin-
cipal and Agent, 53 L. Q. REv. 344, 362, 363 (1937).
70. Planters' Rice-Mlill v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Savannah, 78 Ga. 574. 3 S. E.
.327 (1887).
71. 3 S. E. at 329.
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With regard to the agency of the superintendent who issued the receipt
the court had this to say: "Thus far the cases have been considered as if
there were no element of agency in them . . . but it [the corporation] acted
through an agent, and the real defense is that the agent did not have authority
to bind the corporation, his principal, where no rice was in fact stored ...
The evidence leaves no question that the agent was authorized to issue receipts
of this character. The receipts belonged to a class which the agent had power
to issue. . . . An agent, to tell the truth, may bind his principal by telling
a lie." 72
The estoppel cases that have caused most difficulty are cases where an
agent's authority to make a contract or transfer depended on some condition-
i.e., on some fact,--and the same agent was employed to make representations
about the existence of that fact. A railroad company's shipping agent, for
example, is commonly authorized to issue an "order" bill of lading on con-
dition that the carrier has received goods for shipment. Such a bill of lading
embodies a contract whereby the carrier is obligated to transport the goods
and to deliver them to the order of the consignee. Such bills of lading are
widely used as instruments of credit and fraudulent agents sometimes fabri-
cate bills of lading and issue them when no goods have been shipped. Has
the banker or other person who advances money on the faith of such a bill
of lading recourse against the carrier? Judicial opinions on this question in-
dicate a desire to hold the carrier. That result is deemed commercially
expedient. And yet, says Professor Vance: "It is clear that the issue of
bills of lading by the agent of a carrier without the receipt of the goods
specified ig not even apparently authorized." 73 If the main thesis of this
article is sound, the carrier should be held. The basic question is whether
the carrier should be charged with the agent's representation that goods have
been received. Since a representation is a non-juristic act, it is logical, as well
as expedient, that the carrier should be so charged.
Two things have hindered the courts in coming to the desired result of
holding the carrier: (1) an inadequate analysis of the character of bills
of lading and (2) a superficial application of the rule that an agent cannot
enlarge his own authority.
Let us scrutinize a typical bill of lading. What does it purport to be?
First of all .it is a recital that certain goods have been received by the
carrier. "Received the property described below"-these are the first words
in the standard form. It is purely a representation, as much so as though
the words appeared on a separate piece of paper. Second, there appears on
the form of a bill of lading the terms of a contract made by the carrier.
72. Ibid.
73. Vance, Liability for the Unauthoriked Torts of Agents, 4 MIcH. L. REV
199, 199-200 (1905).
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"Said company agrees to carry to its usual place of delivery at said des-
tination." The contract words of the bill of lading, recording its agree-
ment, are analytically distinct from the representation of fact, that certain
goods have been received.
Let us concede that the making of a contract must be authorized in order
to bind the principal; but let us insist that the making of representations,
like the doing of other non-juristic acts, does not need to be authorized.
As to them the question is whether the person who made the representations
did so within the scope of his employment.
In the bill-of-lading cases the representation that goods have been
received happens to be one that would work an estoppel; it happens to be
printed on the same sheet of paper with a contract; and it happens to be
signed by a person who makes both contracts and representations for his
company. But none of these circumstances takes away the character of the
representation, and we have the simple question of whether the agent was
employed to make such representations.
There can be no doubt that shipping agents are within their employment
when they say that goods have been received. They are furnished with blank
receipts, that is, with forms of bills of lading, and the first word on such
forms is "Received." It is a part of the agent's job to make such representa-
tions. But does the agent make his representation to a remote purchaser of
the bill of lading? He certainly does. The order bill of lading is designed to
circulate as a symbol of the goods while they are in transit. The agent knows
that. Says Finch, J., in a bill-of-lading case: "The bills were made for the
precise purpose, so far as the agent and Williams were concerned, of de-
ceiving the bank by their representations, and every bill issued not stamped
was issued with the expectation of the principal that it would be transferred
and used in the ordinary channels of business, and be relied upon as evidence
of ownership or security for advances. Those thus trusting to it and affected
by it, are not accidentally injured, but have done what they who issued the
bill had every reason to expect. Considerations of this character provide the
basis of an equitable estoppel, without reference to negotiability or directness
of representation." 74
Now let us notice a second source of confusion in the bill-of-lading cases.
It is elementary that a person cannot create or enlarge his own authority.75
He cannot by the fiat of his will confer authority on himself and he cannot
make himself an agent merely by saying that he is one. A superficial ap-
plication of this elementary rule has sometimes been supposed to militate
against the idea that an agent's representation can ever affect his authority.
74. Bank of Batavia v. New York L. E. & W. R. R., 106 N. Y. 195, 201, 12 N. E.
433, 434-35 (1887).
75. 1 MECHni, AGENCY § 285 (2d ed. 1914).
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But authority to act is often given by a principal on a condition that some
fact exists or shall come to pass. In such cases it may well be that the agent
is employed to make representations about the existence of that fact. While
he cannot willfully expand his authority he may be employed to make
representations that estop his employer from denying certain authority.7G
And so when an agent represents, within the scope of his employment that
Zertain goods have been received, he estops his company from denying
that the agent had authority to issue a contract for their carriage. As pointed
out above, representations have sometimes been mistaken for, or at least
assimilated with, juristic acts, such as the making of contracts. The next
step was to assume that, like juristic acts, they must be authorized by the
principal in order to hold him. This idea has led courts in many estoppel
cases to exonerate the principal when commercial expediency, sound doctrine
and common sense would dictate that he should be held.
In an early English case77 the captain of a ship had issued a bill of
lading when no goods had been shipped. The plaintiff, having made advanceb
on the faith of this bill of lading, sued the owner of the ship, in case, to
recover the amount of his advances. Judgment was for the defendants.
The court said: "The point presented by the several pleas is substantially
one and the same, viz. whether the master of a ship, signing a bill of lading
for goods which have never been shipped, is to be considered as the agent
of the owner in that behalf, so as to make the latter responsible ...
It is not contended that the captain had any real authority to sign bills of
lading, unless the goods had been shipped; nor can we discover any ground
upon which a party taking'a bill of lading by indorsement, would be justified
in assuring that he had authority to sign such bills, whether the goods were
on board or not." 78
A case in the Supreme Court of the United States 79 presented facts
that were substantially similar. The same result was reached: the owner of
tie boat was exonerated. The court said that it is a question of pure agency
and the agent's acts are not binding on the owner, if the facts on which his
power depended did not exist-i.e. if the goods had not been received by
the carrier. If the premise be accepted that the question is one of "pure
agency" and that authority for the captain's representation must be found,
it is difficult to escape from the reasoning of these courts. But a good
many courts have found a way to reach a different result. The New York
courts have consistently held carriers liable on false bills of lading issued
by their agents.80 This they have done on a theory that is substantially in
76. 2 id. §§ 1800-1801.
77. Grant v. Norway, 10 C. B. 665, 138 Eng. Rep. 263 (C. P. 1851).
78. Id. at 687, 688, 138 Eng. Rep. at 271, 272.
79. Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7, 26 L. Ed. 998 (1881).
80. Armour v. Michigan Cent. R. R., 65 N. Y. 111 (1875); Bank of Batavia v.
New York L. E. & W. R. R., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. 433 (1887).
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accord with the thesis of this article: the agent represents that the goods have
been received, such representations are made in the scope of the agent's
employment, they need not be authorized and they operate to estop the
carrier. As Finch, J., explained, where a principal has clothed an agent with
power to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact, necessarily
and peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of
which the act of executing the power is itself a representation, the principal
is estopped from denying the existence of the fact to the prejudice of a third
person who has dealt with the agent in good faith in reliance upon the
representation.8 ' And in a Wisconsin case it is said that "The exercise of the
authority itself is, unambiguously, such a representation." 82
It may be added to what Judge Finch has said that in the bill-of-lading
cases the representation is not only implied in the agent's "act of executing
the power"; it is prominently and expressly made in the bill of lading. In some
cases, however, the representation is made only by implication. 83 A good many
state courts followed the Supreme Court of the United States in exonerating
the carrier in the false bill-of-lading cases; and about the same number of
state courts followed the New York decisions holding the carrier. The
common law on the subject thus came to an unsatisfactory condition. Congress
and most of the state legislatures took a hand. They passed statutes to the
effect that if a bill of lading has been issued on behalf of a carrier by one of
its station agents the carrier shall be liable to one who purchases such a bill
of lading in good faith. This legislation has brought uniformity and no doubt
serves the convefnience of the commercial world. It is a reproach to the
common law, however, that legislation was found to be necessary. A more
careful analysis would have disclosed that representations are n6n-juristic
acts and that the elementary law of master and servant is sufficient to hold
the carrier.
There is another group of cases that present substantially the same
question of agency as is presented in the false bill-of-lading cases. These
are cases where an agent of a corporation, whose business it is to issue
certificates of stock in the corporation when old ones have been turned in,
presumes to issue such certificates when the old ones have not been turned
in. The corporation is generally held liable to one who purchases such a
false certificate and the reasons given are substantially the same as those
given in the bill-of-lading cases.
8 4
81. Bank of Batavia v. New York L. E. & W. R. R., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E.
433 (1887).
82. Arnold v. National Bank of Waupaca, 126 Wis. 362, 105 N. W. 828, 831 (1905).
83. North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill 262 (N. Y. 1842); Arnold v. National
Bank of Waupaca, 126 Wis. 362, 105 N. W. 828 (1905).
84. In Fifth Ave. Bank of N. Y. v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. Ferry, 137 N. Y. 231,
33 N. E. 378, 380 (1893), the court said, "It is true that the-secretary and transfer
agent had no authority to issue a certificate of stock except upon the surrender and
cancellation of a previously existing valid certificate, and the signature of the president and
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I Another interesting illustration of a statement which virtually enlarged
the agent's power is found in Holden v. Phelps,85 where a board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the "treasurer" of the company to "discharge
and release mortgages." One man held the position of secretary-treasurer.
As secretary he recorded the resolution and made it read as authorizing him
to "discharge, release and assign mortgages." He showed the resolution thus
recorded to the plaintiff, who became assignee for value of a mortgage which
the treasurer assigned to him in the name of the bank. The purchase
money paid by the plaintiff to the treasurer was misappropriated by the
latter. It was held that the bank was bound by the assignment. The repre-
sentation which this agent made as to the extent of his power was within his
employment and so estopped the company.
OMISSION TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS
In the cases which we have considered up to this point, a servant-agent,
having been given the task of making representations, spoke falsely. Let
us now suppose that a servant-agent, who has been given the task to speak on
occasion, omits altogether to speak when the occasion arises. Is the master-
principal chargeable with the omission? It is true, with regard to other
kinds of acts, that an omission to act may be in the scope of a servant's
employment and when that occurs the master is charged with the consequences.
A carrier of passengers, for example, is liable when a servant within the
scope of his employment omits to protect a female passenger against indig-
nities.8 6 A carrier is liable also when its servants omit to prevent a drunken
passenger from falling off a train.87 It is likewise liable when its servants
omit to stop a train from which a passenger has fallen and to return to care
for the fallen passenger.88 It was also held liable when one of its laborers
took down a set of bars along the right of way to let his own team through
and omitted to put the bars up again.8 9
Naturally enough there is a like result when the servant-agent is
treasurer first obtained to the certificate to be issued; but these were facts necessarily
and peculiarly within the knowledge of the secretary, and the issue of the certificate in
due form was a representation by the secretary and transfer agent that these conditions
had been complied with, and that the facts existed upon which his right to act depended."
See also New York & N. H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (1865). And Jaggard, J.,
in Penas v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 931 (1910), says,
"A secretary of a corporation, intrusted with the seal of a corporation and authorized to
sign certificates of stock, issues unauthorized certificates and appropriates the proceeds.
The agent, having no authority, could not have acted for his employer, but the corporation
is held estopped from denying the validity of the fraudulent issue."
85. 141 Mass. 456, 5 N. E. 815 (1886).
86. Croaker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504 (1875).
87. Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 70 N. H. 607, 50 At]. 103 (1901).
88. Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N. E. 282 (1892).
89. Chapman v. New York Central Ry., 33 N. Y. 369, 88 Am. Dec. 392 (1865).
This happened after the worker's regular working hours, but he testified that "If I
seen anything amiss after that, I had to do it."
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charged with a duty to give warning or other notice and he omits entirely
to speak. Let us first consider cases where an employee omits to notify
a third person of impending danger when it was a part of his employment to
give such notice. It has already been pointed out that flagmen at railroad
crossings are persons who make representations. It is their assigned task to
represent to persons who approach that the tracks whether they are clear
and it is safe to cross them. In a leading case 90 brought for damages because
defendant's switch engine had run down the plaintiff, evidence indicated that
the flagman failed to perform his duty and was standing by the side of a
stationary freight car with his flag under his arm in conversation with another
person. The court declared that, "Although it is not negligent for a railroad
company to omit to keep a flagman, yet if one is employed at a particular
crossing, his neglect to perform the usual and ordinary functions of the place
may be sufficient to charge the company." 91 This holding has been approved
and followed in later New York cases. 92
Let us next consider cases where a servant-agent should as a part of
his employment relay information to his employer. The right or liability of
an employer often depends on whether he has notice or information of certain
facts. Is he chargeable with notice or knowledge that comes to his-servant-
agent? Professor Mechem says, "It is the general rule, settled by an un-
broken current of authority, that notice to, or knowledge of, an agent while
acting within the scope of his authority and in reference to a matter over
which his authority extends, is notice to, or knowledge of, the principal."93
As an example, notice to the janitor of an apartment house with regara to a
defective floor in the building is chargeable to the owner. 94 And so is notice to
an agent in charge of a building.95 Knowledge of a defendant's construction
foreman that an uninsulated high voltage wire had been left dangerously
close to the floor where plaintiff was working was chargeable to the
defendant.96
The fact that the knowledge of or notice to the agent was not actually
communicated to his employer will not prevent the operation of the general
90. Kissenger v. New York & H. R. R., 56 N. Y. 538 (1874).
91. Id. at 543.
92. McGovern v. New York & H. R. R., 67 N. Y. 417 (1876); Finklestein v.
New York & H. R. R., 41 Hun 34 (N. Y. 1886).
93. 2' MECHEm, AGENCY § 1803 (2d ed. 1914). See also RESTATEmENT, AGENCY
§ 275 (1933).
94. Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 282 N. Y. 442, 26 N. E. 2d
970 (1940).
95. Goodstein v. Milmo Realty Corp., 8 N. Y. S. 2d 243 (N. Y. City Ct. 1938).
96. Hill v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 204 S. C. 83, 28 S. E. 2d 545 (1943).
See also Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 Ill. 513, 36 N. E. 990 (1894) ; Duffy v. Bankers
Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913) ; Aultman & Taylor Co v. Hefner, 67
Tex. 54, 2 S. W. 861 (1886); Buckeye Saw Mfg. Co. v. Rutherford, 65 AV. Va. 395,
64 S. E. 444 (1909).
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rule that the master-principal is chargeable with such knowledge or notice.0 7
What is the explanation of this dogmatic rule? Two distinct theories have
been advanced. One is to the effect that there is "legal identity" of the
principal and agent. The other is that the agent is conclusively presumed
to have communicated his notice or knowledge to his principal. The first is
obviously a fiction. The second'does nothing more than restate the rule, and
as Professor Seavey aptly says it, "is valuable only when opposed to the
facts." 98
Is there a simple and rational explanation of the rule whereby knowledge
of facts possessed by an agent is imputed to his principal? Yes, there is. Be it
noted that the act we are concerned with is the giving of notice by an employee
to his employer. That-like the making of any other representation-is a non-
juristic act. The agency question is, therefore, not one of "authority" to do
the act; it is rather a question of "employment" to do the act. Suppose the
janitor of an apartment house knows about a dangerous hole in the floor.
Must he have authority to report it to the owner? It would seem not, and that
it is rather a question of his employment. But a janitor is called a "servant."
Suppose the employee who gets the notice or information is called an "agent"
and that, on occasion, he makes contracts or does other juristic acts for his
principal? It should make no difference what we call him, and it should make
no difference that he does both juristic and non-juristic acts. This act of giving
notice is non-juristic and calls only for the fact of employment in order to
charge the employer for the consequence of its omission.
It frequently is the duty of a servant-agent to make representation to
his employer. Says judge Bradley in the case of The Distilled Spirits, "The
general rule that a principal is bound by the knowledge of his agent is based
on the principle of law, that it is the agent's duty to communicate to his prin-
cipal the knowledge which he has respecting the subject-matter of negotia-
tion." 99 It is emphasized in a North Dakota case that the doctrine of imputed
notice does not depend on the authority of the agent. 100
Theory and judicial utterance alike seem to indicate that the doctrine of
imputed notice rests on the agent's employment to communicate certain facts
97. Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N. W. 410 (1924); Westinghouse
Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Hubert, 175 Mich. 568, 141 N. W. 600 (1913).
98. Seavey, Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1916).
99. 11 Wall. 356, 367, 20 L. Ed. 167 (U. S. 1870). And Bean, J., in Pennoyer v. Willis,
26 Ore. 1, 36 Pac. 568, 569 (1894), makes the same point in these words: "This rule is
generally said to be based upon the theory that it is the duty of the agent to communicate
to his principal the knowledge possessed by him relating to the subject-matter of his agency
,and material to his principal's protection." This was quoted with approval in Hill v. Caro-
lina Power and Light Co., 204 S. C. 83, 28 S. E. 2d 545, 550 (1943).
100. Leisen v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 20 N. D. 316, 127 N. W. 837 (1910). Fisk,
J., says: "The insurer is charged with the knowledge acquired by his agent in making or
negotiating a contract of insurance, not because he has consented to be so charged, nor
because he has authorized his agent so to bind him, but because, as a legal consequence of
the relation he sustains to the agent, the latter's knowledge is imputed to him." 127 N. W.
at 843.
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to his employer. In other words the doctrine of imputed notice is an aspect of
the doctrine of espondeat su-perior. Assuming that information has come to
an employee whose business it is to relay it to his employer, the employee will
either pass it on, in which event the employer will have the information; or
else the employee will not pass it on, and so be remiss in the scope -of his
employment. In either case there is justice and reason in charging the em-
ployer with notice.
SUMMARY
The law of agency is found in digests, textbooks and encyclopedias
under two headings-"Master and' Servant" and "Principal and Agent." In
both divisions of the law of agency we study cases ,yhere one person acts in
behalf of another. But in the Master-and-Servant cases the word is "em-
ployment" and in the Principal-and-Agent cases the word is "authority."
The difference is more than a difference of words. Either authority or em-
ployment creates agency in the broad sense but there is a vast difference in
what it takes to establish the one or the other. Agency to perform non-juristic
acts-found in the Master-and-Servant cases and generally called employ-
ment-is rationalized on the footing that a master should take the risk of his
enterprise and so be liable for acts done by one in his employment. Agency to
do juristic acts-found in the Principal-and-Agent cases-is rationalized on
a footing that a principal should be bound only in accordance with his con-
sent. His agent needs to be authorized.
Where do representations fit into this division of the law of agency?
Should they be regimented under the head of "Master and Servant" or under
the head of "Principal and Agent"? Considerable care has been taken in this
article to indicate the nature of representations. They are non-juristic acts and
agency to make representations would seem, therefore, to call for employment,
not authorization. Respondeat superior.
When representations have been assigned to their place alongside of
other non-juristic acts under the heading of "Master and Servant" our job
would seem to be nearly done. The only thing remaining would be to apply
the elementary, well-settled doctrine, that a master is liable for acts done by
his servant in the scope of his employment. There have, however, been con-
fusion of thought and uncertainty of result among the cases. This is, for the
most part, due to inadequate analysis.
In the first place, representations have sometimes been mistaken for
juristic acts. Their physical aspect--commonly a speaking or writing-is like
that of juristic acts; the actor just "makes talk." This superficial resemblance
has obscured the idea that juristic acts are manifestations of consent to be
bound, whereas representations are not so. The legal consequence of a
representation is imposed regardless of the speaker's consent.
,1948)
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In the second place, the law regarding agency to make representations
has been distributed among such subjects as fraud, slander, 6stoppel and just
plain representations like those made by a watchman at a crossing. To be sure
these subjects are vastly different from each other. But they have a large
common factor in that a representation is the basic act of every one of them;
and agency to make representations for an employer is the same whether the
particular representation leads to one or another legal consequence. Cases
involving fraud, slander, estoppel and other topics have been examined in this
essay in order to illustrate and check the idea that the agency question is the
same in all of them. It may seem a far cry from the case of a watchman at a
crossing, beckoning to a traveler that it is safe to cross the tracks, to the case
of a shipping agent, who signs and issues a statement in a bill of lading that
certain goods have been received. And yet both employees have done the same
kind of an act-they have made a representation. The agency question is
the same.
In the third place our terminology is misleading. We commonly divide
persons who act for others into "servants" and "agents." These are handy
terms, but they must be used with caution. When, for example, we call the
person who did a given act "agent," and then say "agents must be authorized,"
we have made the word "agent" a term in our reasoning process. This may
lead to error. It does lead to error when the act in question happens to be a
representation-a non-juristic act.
In the fourth place, this form of classification ("Master and Servant"
and "Principal and Agent") obscures the fact that one and the same employee
may be engaged to do both kinds of acts. He may need authority for some of
his acts and not for others.
These misconceptions ha;ve obscured a simple problem. They have pro-
duced doubt and confusion about what must be shown in order to establish
the agency of one person to speak for another. The result, however, was in-
evitable. Representations are inherently and naturally non-juristic acts. That
character has stubbornly asserted itself and a broad view of the cases reveals
that the actual holdings have come to be in accord with sound theory. The
reasoning in many cases is confusing and the language inept; but the net
result is that agency to make representations exists, or not, according to the
elementary doctrine that an employer is chargeable with what his employee
does in the scope of his employment.
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